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Engaging retailers: giving them voice or controlling their voice, a supplier’s perspective. 
 
Hirschman (1970) suggests that every member of a group can influence the group by either 
expressing their voice or exiting the group. Subsequent research has looked at exit-voice-
loyalty from the supplier-retailer perspective (Blois, 2008). 
 
This paper takes an overview of the wholesaler-retailer relationship in the UK convenience 
sector; it considers how their approach to exit-voice-loyalty may be affecting the wholesalers’ 
turnover. 
 
The results of the research suggest that the wholesalers do not use cost of exit or enabling 
retailer voice exclusively; instead they now tend to combine both within their retailer 
relationship strategies. 
 
Track: Marketing and Retail 
 
Word count: 6492
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Introduction 
Hirschman (1970) suggests that every member of a group can influence the group by either 
expressing their voice or exiting the group. Recent research suggests that SMEs could learn 
from the Supply Chain Management techniques developed by larger firms that influence this 
decision and manage the outcomes of exit or voice of the individual member, within the 
context of the supply chain (Adams, Khoja & Kauffman, 2012).  These supply chains do not 
exist in a vacuum, not only are they influenced by the relationship between the actors in the 
supply chain and the economic goals of these actors, they are also influenced by the economy 
and society within which the supply chain operates (Ping, 1997 and Pan, Sheng & Xie, 2012). 
It might therefore be expected that the influences upon the use of exit, voice and loyalty 
within supply chains are complex, yet, to date, little systematic study of their use has been 
published (Ping, 1993 and Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, 2001) 
This research is set in the context of supply chains involving wholesalers and (independent) 
retailers of FMCG and grocery in the UK, specifically the independent convenience sector. 
The context is of interest because the longer routes (via wholesalers) to smaller, independent 
stores have been seen as under attack from shorter supply chain routes involving direct 
relationships between the brand owners and the multiple retailers. The perception of danger 
may seem all the more acute given the recent increased focus upon convenience formats, 
traditionally the territory of the independents. Yet, empirical evidence and recent share gains 
demonstrate the robust response of at least some independents, organised usually in 
‘collaborative’ networks attached to the wholesaler companies. With notable exceptions such 
as Jambulingham, Kathuria & Nevin, (2011), systems of wholesale-retail channels and their 
management remain largely obscure in a literature that has focused to a greater extent upon 
the multiple grocers (Kumar, 2008).  It is appropriate and timely, therefore, to explore 
management within wholesaler-retailer systems and specifically to seek to understand how 
individual actors and the systems do respond to the immense pressures that the multiples 
place upon them.  
The paper therefore applies the exit-voice-loyalty framework in order to develop an 
understanding of the loyalty framework focused of facilitating voice or restricting exit (within 
the wholesaler-retailer portion of the supply chain). Industry statistics are used to illustrate 
the turnover trends of the major wholesalers in this sector and an overview of these 
wholesalers strategic direction in relation to the exit-voice-loyalty framework. From this the 
paper argues that in the current market place the wholesalers encouraging voice  at the same 
time as restricting exit may be gaining market share from those focusing on restricting exit. In 
conclusion the paper outlines future research directions for primary research that investigates 
the true nature of the relationship between retailers and wholesalers in the modern 
distribution channel. 
The paper will explore the impact of the combination of control of exit or encouragement of 
voice of the retailers (the member) on the wholesalers’ (the group controller) turnover. The 
research does not claim that this is the only influence on the performance of the wholesalers 
but will look for commonalities in their actions that may be affecting patterns of purchasing 
by the retailers. 
The paper is organised as follows: a discussion of the exit-voice-loyalty framework; an 
outline of the data sources used; an outline of trends in the convenience sector; an outline of 
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the implied strategic directions of the top wholesalers and finally a model that plots the 
current position of these wholesalers within the framework. 
Exit and Voice, Hirschman and supply chain relationships 
Hirschman considered three behaviours of individuals within a group context mainly based 
within the consumer and political arena.  He highlighted the dependence of loyalty on the two 
individual actions of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ seeing both these actions as key to the group’s 
sustainability. 
This matches two main functions required of supply chain relationships which are to 
encourage efficient internal communication of information within the chain which is often 
achieved through relationships (Koulikoff & Souviron, 2006) and maintain effective control 
of membership of the chain maintaining valuable resources within the chain in the face of 
other chains attempting to gain these resources recognising the autonomy and 
interdependence of all parts of the chain (Seufert et al, 1999). 
Wholesalers within the convenience sector need to encourage the growth of the 
entrepreneurial voice of their independent retailers but maximise their buying power by 
restricting the amount of retailer spend outside of their supply chain. This creates a tension 
between the economic need of central purchasing and the political need of enhancing the 
entrepreneurial drive of individual retailers. A similar tension has been noted by Bradach 
(1998), with respect to franchising, where the entrepreneurial drive leads to differences at the 
unit level which can conflict with perceived system needs. Anderson & Jack (2002) also 
discussed the effects of embeddedness in a group on the entrepreneurial process of the 
individual but the phenomenon has not, however, been previously highlighted in more 
independent retail systems such as those to be studied here. 
This research will seek to investigate the interaction of economic need and political tension 
created in the relationship between small and large players in the modern supply chain. The 
three fields of research investigating these relationships have created three differing lenses to 
observe the phenomena. Economists would seek to explain these relationships on rational 
economic decisions, moralists would look to individual decisions to explain them and 
political scientists would look at the overall effect on society to explain the actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dilemma was acknowledged by Hirschman (1970) who set out to combine political 
science and economics to explain complex business relationships and their outcomes.  He 
referred to the economists’ relative unconcern compared to that of the political scientist as  
Economists                                    
Individual Rational Economic Decisions 
Moralists    
Individual Decisions 
Political Scientists 
Overall effect on society 
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 “the economists watch lapses of any one of his patients (such as business firms) with far 
greater equanimity than either the moralist who is convinced of the intrinsic worth of every 
one of his patients (individuals) or the political scientist whose patient (the state)is unique 
and irreplaceable.(p2) 
Limitation of time and resources means that this research cannot cover the broad spectrum of 
the relationships, so the research will restrict itself to the wholesalers’ development of the 
SME retailers’ voice and the effect this has on their decision to exit or partially exit their 
supply chain. The rationale behind choosing this phenomenon to study is that managing the 
effect of it on both attitudinal loyalty (where the retailer voices their level of support for the 
wholesale group and its activities) and behavioural loyalty (where the retailer buys products 
from the wholesaler and its recommended suppliers in preference to market alternatives) 
causes considerable cost to the supply chain. The control of this phenomena within the supply 
chain includes managing the attitudinal loyalty via the expectations of individual members 
within the chain (Gilliland & Bello, 2002, Leonidou, Palihawadana & Theodosiou, 2006 and 
Caceres & Paparoidamis, 2007) and limiting (and managing) the effect of behavioural loyalty 
with individuals exiting or part exiting the supply chain (Leonidou, Palihawadana & 
Theodosiou, 2006).  This raises the potential of an attitudinally loyal retailer who fully 
supports the ideals of the wholesale group behaving disloyally by purchasing a percentage of 
their goods from outside the wholesalers supply chain and this pressure faced by these 
particular supply chains leads to the practical usefulness of a fuller understanding – that 
reaches beyond the merely economic - of this phenomenon.    
 
 
 
 
 
Hirschman (1970) developed the idea of a voice expressed by loyal members of a community 
and compared the effect and the cost of this voice with the effect and cost of exit of 
individuals from a community.  Though the Hirschman framework has not been deployed in 
such contexts (for an exception see Blois 2008), some of the concerns captured in 
Hirschman’s frameworks are evident in recent literature.   
A substantial strand of research within the field of supply chain management has considered 
control over the physical movement of goods and the flow of knowledge. In this field, 
explanation draws especially upon economic theories and modelling to explain continued 
participation within a network (Bacharach, 1982 p26, Jarillo, 1988 & Dyer& Singh, 1998). 
Further, some supply chain researchers, following especially Cox (2003), explain continued 
participation through industrial structures and trends. A second approach is evident amongst 
IMP (Industrial Marketing and Purchasing) researchers who emphasise the notion of 
interaction and relationships as well as the embeddedness of such relationships within 
broader contexts (for explanation of the IMP model see Wilson 1995). The IMP group thus 
addresses the combination of micro and macro largely through case studies that illuminate 
specific contexts. Loyalty, by this reading, arises, if it does, through the gradual development 
of a relationship within the context and seen in holistic terms. A third stream of research 
Attitudinal Loyalty 
Behavioural Loyalty 
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focuses explicitly upon marketing (or distribution) channels. Eschewing the structural and 
economic modelling as well as the contextually grounded case study method, this stream of 
research has taken ideas from the field of social psychology to provide a behaviourist account 
of action. The original inspiration for this direction is seen in work collected by Stern 1969. 
Considerable attention of late (Kelly & Scott, 2012 building on the work of Morgan & Hunt 
1994) has turned to the concept of commitment, recognised as having both attitudinal and 
behavioural elements. These share some features of loyalty, in Hirschman’s framework.             
Therefore, a review of established work shows that some understanding of elements of the 
framework can be derived from previous studies but that the association between such 
elements is absent. The economic and political (behavioural) have generally been isolated 
from each other across the fields of research. The emphasis upon context (above framework) 
is some fields and upon large quantitative studies of theoretic frameworks with lesser 
attention paid to the specificity of context also leaves open a middle space to integrate 
theoretic framework and systems. 
Exit and voice 
 
Hirschman(1970 pp21-29) agreed with the economist lens that exit (that is to cease buying 
off the supplier) was the basic consumer tool to correct the market place, business that failed 
to deliver would see their customers exit the relationship to a business that delivered and this 
process should eliminate non delivering businesses from the market place.  This would be a 
simple explanation for failed supply chains where the chain has failed to deliver the goods to 
the end consumer at an acceptable price, but may also be applied to businesses within the 
supply chain. Simply, exit provides one action that convenience stores may take with respect 
to wholesalers and accordingly, the market mechanism would be at work to remove some 
wholesalers.   
  
Hirschman (1970, pp36-43) recognised that exit was not the only mechanism available to the 
buyer, he also saw an individual’s use of voice (that is to seek to correct the dissatisfaction in 
the relationship between the buyer and seller buy discussing the issues) as the result of the 
individual’s decision that the effort of using their voice would be compensated by its effect.  
He concluded that this is more likely for this to occur where collective action was possible.  
He also noted that within a buying relationship the value of the product will influence the 
decision to use voice over exit, so that the more expensive the purchase the more likely the 
buyer will use voice rather than exit in their relationship with their buyer (Simatupang & 
Sridharan, 2004).  From a supply chain perspective this would suggest supply chains which 
encourage collective actions will encourage voice over exit but at the same time this choice 
between voice and exit is also influenced by the relative cost of the purchase (Ping, 1997). 
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Figure 1 Collective and voice adapted from Hirschman (1970) 
Having considered the collective nature of the relationship and the cost of the purchase 
Hirschman (1970 pp47-48) then considered the quality of a good or service and how this 
influenced the decision to exit.  Here he argued that buyers who exit  when price increases are 
not the same as buyers who exit  when quality decreases even though a fall in quality can be 
seen as an increase in price.  He concluded that the quality conscious buyers are more likely 
to use voice whilst the cost conscious are more likely to exit (Hirschman 1970 p53). For 
supply chains this would imply that cost driven supply chains are more likely to have a larger 
churn in membership than those supply chains that place a greater emphasis upon quality. 
The latter can be seen in the addition of value adding services as well as in quality of product 
and here we would expect to see more vocal relationships. 
Hirschman (1970 pp55-61) then considered the effect of exit and voice on suppliers’ 
monopolies.  Here he considered a monopoly driven by cost focus in which the most quality 
conscious members have left. Without their use of voice the quality of the monopoly’s output 
falls to an unacceptable level even to the purely cost focused buyer.  This situation he defined 
as a lazy monopoly that continues only through the lack of alternative for cost conscious 
buyers (either through geographical isolation or low economic power) whilst quality 
conscious buys look for alternative solutions at higher price or a different location.   In some 
cases, suppliers can seek to manipulate overall exit by ‘gold plating’ services to certain 
buyers.  
These internal forces can encourage inertia but so can external forces, for instance when the 
culture within the industry doesn’t accept exit then this can have an effect on the use of voice.   
In considering the combined dynamics of exit and voice, some explanation may therefore be 
offered for what may be perceived as the delayed demise of large cost driven poor quality 
supply chains and also for the birth of smaller quality focused supply chains developed from 
their demise. 
 
 
Low cost of exit to high cost of exit 
Low 
collective 
group to 
high 
collective 
group 
7 
 
Exit, voice and loyalty 
Buyer’s perceptions also have an effect on exit and voice (Hirschman pp62-75).  Customers 
with nowhere else to go (high exit cost) only have the voice option whilst customers with 
choice may exit the supply chain if the cost of quality elsewhere is lower than that within the 
group.  This perceived availability of exit may be a driver for loyalty to a supplier and can be 
used by a supplier who could threaten the buyer with expulsion unless they act ‘loyally’.  
This is reversed where replacement of the supplier is easy (low exit cost) and then the buyer 
can act disloyally with less threat of expulsion.  Where there is an alternative, but the buyer 
does not want to exit even though they consider their use of voice to have had no effect upon 
the supplier then they can use boycott (that is suspend purchases (behavioural disloyalty) or 
cooperation with the groups ideals (attitudinal disloyalty) for a limited period of time). This is 
a temporary exit backed by a voice (Hirschman pp76-86).  
Exit and voice are driven by the costs of entry to and exit from a group.  In this way a 
supplier may, to some degree, create loyalty by encouraging voice instead of exit. Hirschman 
(pp93-96) noted the importance of initiation in building loyalty (cost of entry), a good 
initiation process would encourage voice should quality fall and this mediates the exit 
alternative.  Probably the strongest form of initiation is the family unit, this also produces the 
severest relationship penalties for exit where more is lost than just a loss of a business 
relationship. The effect of exit and entry costs can be mapped onto voice, exit and loyalty and 
applied to supply chain relationships where the wholesaler supplies independent retailers. 
Hirschman’s theory therefore highlights the dynamic interplay between exit, voice and 
loyalty and elements important to that interplay.  These elements include initiation, quality 
versus cost of that which is exchanged, availability of alternatives as well as financial costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Price of entry and exit adapted from Hirschman 
 
Low cost of entry to high cost of entry 
Low 
cost of 
exit  
to 
high 
cost of 
exit 
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Good disloyalty and bad disloyalty 
Hirschman argued that some members of a group ‘will sometimes be held back (from exit) not 
so much by the moral and material sufferings they would themselves have to go through as a 
result of exit , but by the anticipation that the organisation to which they belong would go 
from bad to worse if they left.’ (p98)  This introduces the idea that at points members of a 
group may put the good of the group ahead of their personal gain creating members that are 
‘quality makers’ rather than ‘quality takers’.   
Both quality makers and quality takers have varying levels of loyalty (that is, none exit from 
the group).Quality makers may immerse themselves in the group to the point where ‘full exit 
is impossible’ (p100) that is even if they exit the group they are still contributing voice to it.  
Quality takers may partially remain with the group (that is having some degree of purchasing 
within the supply chain) but levels of exit (or share of overall purchasing maintained within 
the groups supply chain) will depend on personal needs rather than the group’s needs. 
Outside factors may also increase the cost of exit and produce a ‘level of spinelessness’ ( a 
somewhat harsh phrase but refers to inertia of an individual who has the potential to influence 
the group and chooses not to) where even though economic and common sense would 
suggest exit or voice the member does neither because of the perceived cost of exit (pp103-
104), Hirschman suggests that the type of loyalty this produces is useful in that it keeps 
influential members in the group beyond normal loyalty drivers and if they do find ‘their 
spine’ they can be influential in changing the prospects of the group. 
From a supply chain perspective attitudinal loyal members may exercise some degree of 
behavioural disloyalty (degrees of exit in purchasing) for the benefit of the group and disloyal 
attitudinal members (that is retailers with varying degrees of purchase disloyalty) may 
exercise some degree of behavioural loyalty to the group for their own benefit.  This means a 
measure of behavioural loyalty or disloyalty does not always reflect the attitudinal loyalty of 
a member of a group. 
The particular promise of the framework lies in the integration of considerations of exit, 
voice and loyalty and in the more complex understanding of loyalty that takes on board both 
individual, economic factors as well as considerations of the group.  In this way the 
framework allows us to focus attention upon loyalty but treat this as multi-dimensional and 
related to exit and voice. This provides advancement to the notion of commitment. We have 
shown how these ideas might apply in the context of the supply chain and the research 
therefore focus on expanding this understanding. The research will focus on the trends in the 
convenience sector of retail purchasing from the wholesalers and match these to the explicit 
actions of the wholesalers that were designed either to allow voice of their retail customers or 
to restrict their exit options. 
Trends in the Convenience Sector 
The convenience sector was traditionally dominated by independent retailers.  The growth of 
supermarkets, 24 hour shopping and the refocusing of the co-operative has seen many of 
these retailers either leave the sector or join the symbol groups.  This is demonstrated by the 
IGD figures which split the sector into five groups: the three largest groups by number of 
stores (non-affiliated independents, forecourts and symbol groups) contain most of the SMEs 
in the sector but also have large company owned divisions working in them, the two other 
groups the Co-operatives and the multiples play an increasingly important part in the sector. 
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By store numbers the largest group is the non-affiliated stores (39%), by retail sales the 
largest group is the Symbol stores (40%). Sales from the multiples and the Co-ops account 
for 28% of total sales from 11% of the total stores. 
Figure 3: Convenience sector split by store numbers (source IGD 2012) 
 
Figure 4 Convenience sector split by retail sales (source IGD 2012) 
 
Wholesalers supplying the convenience sector supply retailers across the three groups of 
Symbol Groups, Non-affiliated and Forecourts.  These wholesalers can also be active in the 
foodservice industry supplying everything from hospitals to restaurants. 
Traditionally the wholesalers were split across three sub groups: 
• Cash and Carries where the retailer came to the wholesaler to purchase the goods, 
these operations would have an own label offering that might include a fascia for the 
retailer.  There may be basic relationships created between wholesale staff and regular 
retail customers, the exit costs are relatively low compared to delivered wholesalers 
unless there is a strong personal relationship between the retailer and the wholesaler.  
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Again the retail voice possibly depends on the strength of the personal relationship 
between the retailer and the wholesaler. 
• Delivered wholesalers where the goods were delivered to the retailer, these operations 
would build on an own label offering developing a range of relationships with their 
retail customers from preferred supplier to sole supplier.  Delivered wholesalers drive 
monetary exit costs up as they also tie the retailer further into the wholesalers’ brand 
(cost of rebranding the retail outlet and replacing the brand marketing and convincing 
the retailers own customers to switch to another brand).  The relationship exit costs 
rise as the retailer commits more time and energy to relationships with other retailers 
and wholesale staff within the wholesalers’ symbol group.  Different wholesalers 
encourage different levels of retail voice as part of their relationship management 
strategy, handling these voices have a financial cost and the level of commitment 
from the wholesalers to this process appears to vary even within symbol groups. 
• Food Service where the wholesaler would deliver products (sometimes specialising in 
a limited range such as alcoholic drinks) to a wide range of businesses from retail to 
public sector with possibly a small range of catering own label.  This sector like the 
cash and carry sector appears to rely on personal relationships between the customer 
and the supplier rather than the formalised arrangements of the delivered wholesalers 
so exit costs tend to depend on the informal networks created.  Again the customer 
voice depends on the strength of the personal relationships within these networks. 
Cash and carries tend to have no formal relationship exit costs for their customers, in some 
cases geography and lack of competition may be the only exit cost considered by their 
customers.  For these reasons they tend to be the low cost option for the retailers. There may 
be some ethnic group influence on some of the urban wholesale operators with family 
members and relationships extending across the wholesale retail divide.  Cash and carry 
operators have started to create retail voice by the forming of expert group consultations from 
suppliers and individual wholesale managers may well have created strong relationships with 
individual retailers due to the repetitive nature of their purchasing habits.  The lack of support 
offered by these groups in times of incursion by the multiples and the Co-operatives into the 
market place has seen a growing number of cash and carry retailers joining the symbol stores 
of the delivered wholesalers. 
Delivered wholesalers increase the exit costs by encouraging the retailer to use their fascia 
and own label goods, this exclusivity adds to any exit cost the retailer may consider.  The exit 
costs are increased with the introduction of a symbol group where the retailer ‘joins’ a group 
of fellow retailers trading under a common banner this moves beyond merely using a fascia 
of convenience and commitment to the group increases the retailers voice but also increases 
their relationship exit costs. 
The more sophisticated the offer the higher the cost to the retailer tends to be, this is justified 
by the wholesaler on concentrating on the improved impact on the bottom line for the retailer, 
however in times of economic downturn the lower cost price of goods from the less 
complicated cash and carries increases pressure on the purchasing behavioural drift away 
from the symbol groups to the cheaper alternatives.   
SPAR was created with a guild system that allows retail voice to be heard at the strategic 
level of the chain and other symbol groups are looking at mirroring this with ‘representative’ 
retail bodies advising the wholesale side of the supply chain. 
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The more sophisticated symbol groups also offer financing, training and scanning packages 
that add financial exit costs to the relationship costs.  At the top end of exit control the 
wholesaler can control the lease on the retail premises or us legal contracts (verging on 
franchising) to further limit the retailers exit options. 
Food services deliver goods to their clients and build relationship between employees and 
customers that may form some relationship exit barrier, increasingly diminishing numbers in 
this sector may be seen as reducing choice and increasing exit barriers but increasingly 
customers may be using the multiples as food service suppliers. 
The wholesalers in the top thirty can act across all three of these sub groups and some in 
particular Bookers have entered and exited these groups over the period of study. 
As the competition from multiples and Co-operatives has increased, the wholesalers have 
developed their Symbol Stores operation offering more and more services under this 
umbrella.  The level of recruitment to these symbols varies depending on the attractiveness of 
their offer to the retailer.  In 2012 Premier a traditional cash and carry operator and Best One 
a cash and carry operator that has increased its delivered wholesale operation have replaced 
SPAR the established leader in the symbol store sector as largest groups by store numbers.  
Store numbers do not reflect the overall income for these groups as the symbol stores tend to 
attract larger outlets and aim to promote greater purchasing loyalty from their retailers. 
Methodology 
The research gathered published data from the IGD, the trade press (including The Grocer, 
the Independent Grocer, The Convenience Store, The Scottish Grocer and IRN), individual 
websites of the wholesalers.  In particular the research looks at the turnover trend of the top 
thirty wholesalers over the years 2005-2012. This research was supported by informal 
interviews with various members of the trade press, trade associations, retailers, suppliers and 
wholesalers to confirm that the interpretation of the items extracted from the articles reflects 
the perceived current situation. 
Brief summary of the wholesalers: 
Bookers (Premier) 
Bookers is the largest cash and carry operator in the UK , it runs a large food service arm 
delivering to customers from VUE cinemas to Marks and Spencer’s.  To support its retail 
customers, Bookers have developed Premier as a Symbol style operation and still offer the 
more traditional own label service through Happy Shopper and Euro Shopper. Bookers size 
and diversity of retail offer means that it would be impossible to identify correlations between 
how it controls customer voice and exit to the groups turnover. 
Bestways (Best One/Best In) 
Bestway is the second largest cash and carry operator in the UK starting from an ethnic retail 
outlet in London in 1962 and moving into wholesaling in the 1970s.  The group now has 
international operation including the second largest bank in Pakistan.  The wholesale 
operation has expanded through acquisition including buying all of C J Langs (SPAR) cash 
and carries in Scotland in 2010. The group created the Best in brand in 2002 which has a low 
cost of entry compared to the more established symbol brands. Bestways have shown a 
steady rise in retail customer numbers which is reflected in a steady rise in wholesale 
turnover.  It could  be argued that the steady rise in numbers and turnover is purely down to 
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expansion of the business however their commitment to a low cost entry model that is tied 
within the ethnic community may mean that the relative high relationship exit cost (due to 
family and cultural ties across the network) may have contributed to this rise. 
Blakemores, Hendersons and Halls (SPAR ) 
SPAR was the dominant player in the convenience sector from the eighties to the turn of the 
century and its independent retail chains were the obvious acquisition targets for the 
multiples and the Co-operatives when they entered the sector. The SPAR group offers the 
highest level of retail voice within the sector with their formalised guild system which allows 
retailers strategic influence on the marketing spend of the group. There also high exit costs 
both financial and relationship because of the long standing relationship and commitment to 
the brand of many of the retailers. The level of commitment to the symbol group varies 
across the wholesalers.  The three wholesalers have all shown an increase in store numbers 
and turnover.  Balkemore’s merged with Cappers to increase its dominance of this Symbol 
store in the UK.  Hendersons control SPAR  and Vivo in Northern Ireland, this relatively 
small territory and an emphasis away from off sales have given Hendersons a unique offer 
within SPAR in the UK.  Halls is based in the North of England and in 2012 traded 
exclusively under the SPAR banner. 
Langs, Appleby Westward (SPAR) 
These are the two smallest SPAR Regional Distribution Centres in the UK. Langs cover 
SPAR across Scotland, over the study period they have seen all their multisite independent 
retailers exit through acquisition either by the Co-op or into Lang’s company owned division, 
Langs have disposed of their foodservice and cash and carry parts of their business.   Appleby 
Westward control the SW of England, they have stepped into a company owned division with 
an experiment into the larger format Eurospar, this did not work for them and they have 
subsequently disposed of the stores.  Appleby Westward has experienced various owners 
within the study period, moving from part of a large European company to a director buy out. 
Dhamecha and United Wholesale (Todays) 
Both trading within the Today symbol group showing significant increase in turnover, 
Dhamecha based around London with a strong ethnic connection, United trading in and 
around Scotland’s central belt. 
Filshills (Key Store) 
Covers Scotland and North of England initially focused on a limited range now expanding 
range and territory, offering free EPOS to qualifying retailers, not expanding as quickly as 
their United neighbour at the moment. 
Parfett (Landmark) 
Major player in the Landmark group, owners have a strong voice within the sector and tend 
to do things slightly differently including moving towards selling the company to the 
employees 
DCS and East End (Landmark) 
Specialist wholesalers not focused on acting as main supplier of all goods to retailers and no 
intention of creating a symbol group. 
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Costcutter and Palmer & Harvey(MACE) 
Major symbol store operators not included in the Grocer top thirty probably because 
wholesale supply to independent retailers only forms part of the parent business. 
 
Performance of the symbol groups 
Recent years has seen a change in fortunes for the traditional symbol groups and the newer 
cash and carry based symbol groups. 
Figure 5 Size of biggest groups by store numbers 
 
The chart evidences the changing size (by store numbers) of some symbol groups over a 
relatively short time period.  Todays symbol group has experienced a rapid growth in store 
numbers in the last two years, in the same period the Key store group has seen a fall in store 
numbers. 
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Figure 6 Size of smaller groups by store numbers 
 
Observing the turnover of the top thirty wholesalers highlights the size of the two national 
players Booker and Bestway Cash and Carry.  Bestway is demonstrating steady growth whilst 
Bookers sales dipped for a while and are now recovering. 
Figure 7 Top two wholesalers by turnover 
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The Symbol Groups have displayed varying fortunes in their turnover levels.  Musgrave’s, 
the Budgens and Londis national supplier showed a peak in sales that has fallen back in2012. 
The SPAR wholesalers (Blakemores, Hendersons and Halls) have all shown steady increases 
in sales as has the Today wholesaler AG Parfett. 
 
 
Figure 8 Wholesalers turnover 
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Not all the SPAR wholesalers are showing the same growth, Appleby Westward is showing a 
slow decline in sales and CJ Langs appears to have a slight peak in sales and is now dipping. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Spar and Londis/Budgens wholesalers by turnover 
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At the lower end of the sales totals in the top thirty the growth does not appear to depend on 
the Symbol store membership, Dhamecha of Todays and AG Parfett of Landmark are still to 
the two largest wholesalers in this section whilst United Wholesale (Scotland) is seeing a 
good sales growth whilst its fellow Todays group member J W Filshill appears to be 
experiencing a sales plateau. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Today & Landmark wholesalers by turnover 
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Sales through the individual wholesalers are not only linked to these wholesalers’s treatment 
of retailers’ voice and exit because of a variety of other factors discussed below.  However 
this research will seek to identify commonalities between the symbol groups’ retailer voice or 
exit strategies and the individual wholesaler’s actions that may contribute to the movement in 
store numbers or business turnover. 
The wholesale sector does not exist in silos; delivered wholesale retail customers can buy 
some goods from cash and carries or other delivered wholesalers. Some wholesalers operate 
in more than one symbol group (i.e. Musgrave’s with Budgens and Londis), others offer cash 
and carry, food services and delivered wholesale operations (i.e. Bookers) and these offers 
vary across time (i.e. CJ Langs have dropped out of cash and carry and food services to 
concentrate on their SPAR symbol business).   
The wholesalers themselves have also gone through a period of merger and consolidation 
with some of the major players disappearing (SPARs Blakemore’s merger with Cappers in 
2012) and others moving their focus from cash and carry to  a more cost effective version  of 
the delivered wholesale operations (the Today’s group of wholesalers). The table in the 
appendix offers a brief overview of the fascia these wholesalers trade with, their geographical 
area and the type of wholesaler they are. 
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Entry costs, exit costs and voice mechanisms across the wholesalers 
From the data gathered for each of the wholesalers, the entry costs, financial exit costs, 
relationship exit costs and level of voice available to retailers were codified into broad groups 
of: 
Entry cost 
1. Purchase goods from wholesaler depot. 
2. Entry level agreement for standard of store before fascia erected. 
3. Specific store standards required before retailer allowed into group, EPOS system 
preferable. 
4. Symbol store standards required and EPOS system linked to wholesaler. 
Financial Exit costs 
1. No formal agreements, head lease or free equipment. 
2. Few formal agreements, head lease or free equipment. 
3. EPOS system installed but may be used elsewhere, some financing, extended credit 
available. 
4. Financing used from wholesaler, heavy investment in brand mean rebranding costs 
required, EPOS system non-transferable, loss of retrospective payments. 
5. Wholesaler has head lease on property or other large financial arrangements within 
the business. 
Relationship Exit costs. 
1. Mainly loose relationships. 
2. Closer working relationship than traditional C&C. 
3. Moving towards a symbol group. 
4. Strong interaction through ‘guild system’ trade shows, study trips. 
5. Strong personal bond between individual retailers and between retailers and the 
wholesaler. 
 
Voice mechanism 
1. Mainly informal. 
2. Evolving within the group. 
3. Beginning of a group organisation with retailer involvement. 
4. Retail representation within the strategic decision process of the group. 
5. Retail involvement with the strategic decision process of the group. 
These are broad groups that reflect the dynamic relationship between buyers and suppliers.  
Different retailers of the same wholesaler will have differing experiences, reflected in some 
wholesalers spread across the groups. 
 
Table 1 Comparative summary of Entry cost/exit cost & voice mechanism 
Wholesaler Entry costs /basic 
offer 
Exit costs 
Financial 
Exit Costs  
relationship 
Voice mechanism 
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Bookers C&C to symbol store so 
lowest entry level costs 
1 
No formal 
agreements , head 
lease or free 
equipment 
1 
Mainly loose 
relationships 
1 
Mainly informal BUT 
evolving within the group 
1 
Bestways Value for money entry 
into symbol store with 
store criteria’s that will 
require some work 
2 
Few formal 
agreements , head 
lease or free 
equipment BUT 
strong link to 
major Pakistani 
bank so may be 
other financial 
arrangements in 
place 
2/3/4/5 
Closer working 
relationship than 
traditional C&C 
moving towards a 
symbol store operation 
2/3 
Closer working relationship 
than traditional C&C 
2/3 
Blakemores Symbol store group with 
high standards that will 
require work and linked 
to EPOS system at cost 
4 
Few formal 
agreements may 
have head lease so 
no property to sell 
and linked in 
EPOS system 
4/5 
Guild system and 
regular trade events 
(national and 
international) to build 
strong links between 
retailers and the group 
4/5 
Guild system and regular trade 
events (national and 
international) to build strong 
links between retailers and the 
group 
4/5 
Hendersons Symbol store group with 
high standards that will 
require work and linked 
to EPOS system at cost 
4 
Few formal 
agreements may 
have head lease so 
no property to sell 
and linked in 
EPOS system 
4/5 
Guild system and 
regular trade events 
(national and 
international) to build 
strong links between 
retailers and the group 
4/5 
Guild system and regular trade 
events (national and 
international) to build strong 
links between retailers and the 
group 
4/5 
Halls Symbol store group with 
high standards that will 
require work and linked 
to EPOS system at cost 
4 
Few formal 
agreements may 
have head lease so 
no property to sell 
and linked in 
EPOS system 
4/5 
Guild system and 
regular trade events 
(national and 
international) to build 
strong links between 
retailers and the group 
4/5 
Guild system and regular trade 
events (national and 
international) to build strong 
links between retailers and the 
group 
4/5 
Langs Symbol store group with 
high standards that will 
require work and linked 
to EPOS system at cost 
4 
Few formal 
agreements may 
have head lease so 
no property to sell 
and EPOS system 
can be used 
elsewhere 
3/4/5 
Guild system and less 
regular trade events 
(national ) to build 
strong links between 
retailers and the group 
3/4/5 
Guild system and less regular 
trade events (national l) to 
build strong links between 
retailers and the group 
3/4/5 
Appleby 
Westward 
Symbol store group with 
high standards that will 
require work and linked 
to EPOS system at cost 
4 
Few formal 
agreements may 
have head lease so 
no property to sell 
and linked in 
EPOS system 
4/5 
Guild system and less 
regular trade events 
(national l) to build 
strong links between 
retailers and the group 
3/4/5 
Guild system and less regular 
trade events (national l) to 
build strong links between 
retailers and the group 
3/4/5 
Dhamecha  From C&C to lowest 
entry level costs and 
value for money entry 
into symbol store with 
store criterias that will 
require some work 
1/2 
Few formal 
agreements , head 
lease or free 
equipment 
2 
 
Asian run C&C 
servicing large Asian 
community of retailers 
so possible strong links 
4/5 
Asian run C&C servicing 
large Asian community of 
retailers so possible strong 
links 
4/5 
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United 
Wholesale  
From C&C to lowest 
entry level costs and 
value for money entry 
into symbol store with 
store criterias that will 
require some work 
1/2 
Few formal 
agreements , head 
lease or free 
equipment 
2 
 
Closer working 
relationship than 
traditional C&C 
2 
Closer working relationship 
than traditional C&C 
2 
Filshills  lowest entry level costs 
and value for money 
entry into symbol store 
with store criteria’s that 
will require some work 
2/3 
 
Few formal 
agreements , head 
lease or free 
equipment Does 
supply EPOS 
system FOC (for 
qualifying 
retailers) 
2/3 
 
States that it puts the 
retailer first and as still 
expanding may be 
learning with its 
retailers 
3/4 
Rapidly expanding its number 
of retailers may be more 
willing to listen than 
traditional symbol groups3/4/5 
Costcutter Symbol store group with 
high standards that will 
require work and linked 
to EPOS system at cost 
4 
Few formal 
agreements may 
have head lease so 
no property to sell 
and linked in 
EPOS system 
4/5 
Regular trade events 
(national ) to build 
strong links between 
retailers and the group 
But lost charismatic 
leadership and some 
uncertainty over 
direction re Bibby 
3/4/5 
Now owned by large company 
uncertainty over validity of 
retailer voice at moment 
3/4/5 
MACE lowest entry level costs 
and value for money 
entry into symbol store 
with store criteria’s that 
will require some work 
2/3 
 
Few formal 
agreements , head 
lease or free 
equipment BUT 
some examples of 
legal action with 
retailers switching 
groups  
2/3 
Closer working 
relationship than 
traditional C&C set up 
as DW moving 
towards a symbol store 
operation 
3/4 
Have field sales team but this 
small part of Palmer & Harvey 
business 
3/4 
Budgens 
/Londis 
Symbol store group with 
high standards that will 
require work and linked 
to EPOS system at cost 
4 
Few formal 
agreements may 
have head lease so 
no property to sell 
and linked in 
EPOS system 
4/5 
Budgens have tightest 
agreements in trade, 
Londis is the freer 
alternative for retailers 
4/5 
Very similar to SPAR 
operation designed to build 
relationships with retailers 
4/5 
The entry costs for the retailers used to be split with traditional wholesalers offering the 
lowest entry costs and symbol stores offering the highest costs , however as standards 
required by the traditional wholesalers increase and discounts are offered by symbol groups( 
in the competition for new retailers) this difference is merging.  The traditional symbol stores 
(green in figure 11 are still mainly higher than the traditional wholesale groups (yellow in 
figure 11) this reflects the extra costs incurred to achieve minimum store standards required 
by the group, and installation costs involved in EPOS system used to transmit sails 
information between retailer and symbol, group. 
Figure 11 Entry costs 
Entry Costs 1 2 3 4 5 
Bookers 
 wholesale 
group         
Bestways   
 wholesale 
group       
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Blakemores        symbol stores   
Hendersons         symbol stores   
Halls        symbol stores   
Langs        symbol stores   
Appleby Westward        symbol stores   
Dhamecha  
 wholesale 
group 
 wholesale 
group       
United Wholesale  
 wholesale 
group 
 wholesale 
group       
Filshills    
 wholesale 
group 
 wholesale 
group     
Costcutter        symbol stores   
MACE    symbol stores  symbol stores     
Budgens /Londis 
       symbol stores   
 
Comparing entry costs with voice shows a clear grouping of the traditional symbol groups bordering 
a cluster of traditional wholesalers with the greatest increase in turnover (blue font in figure) mixed 
with MACE one of the first symbol groups to appear from a traditional wholesale operative. 
Figure 12 Entry costs compared to voice 
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Providing exclusive EPOS systems and in some cases acting as landlords for retailers pushes 
the exit costs up for suppliers from symbol groups and cash and carries, the more developed 
communication systems (such as SPARs retail guild system) still offers a differential between 
symbol stores and traditional wholesalers.  The traditional wholesalers with the largest 
increase in turnover (blue font in figure) currently appear to have maintained voice without 
the exit costs incurred by the more established operators. 
Figure 13 Compare financial exit costs and voice 
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Comparing relationship costs with voice demonstrates how the traditional wholesalers with 
the greatest increase in turnover appear to be increasing the relationship exit costs by 
improving the opportunity of voice within the supply chain.  This has resulted in a less clear 
distinction between the symbol groups and the more progressive traditional wholesalers when 
comparing relationship exit costs and voice. 
Figure 14 Relationship exit costs compared to voice 
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Conclusion 
Hirschman recognised the strategic dilemma of balancing the cost of allowing voice with the 
impact of controlling loyalty with high exit cost.  The convenience sector is now 
experiencing cost pressures from outside competition which is focusing the relationship 
strategies of the traditional wholesalers and the symbol groups. 
The traditional wholesalers appear to be moving from entry level relationships (Hirschman, 
1970), low voice, low cost of exit up to the high cost of exit, high voice role of the symbol 
stores.  The more progressive traditional wholesalers appear to be achieving this without the 
high exit costs associated with the symbol groups.  This may be because the associated costs 
involved with allowing voice are cumulative, which would also explain why some of the 
symbol groups are moving more to raising exit costs at the expense of supporting voice in a 
bid to cut costs to the retailers.  
The dilemma identified by Ping (1997) of encouraging voice for loyal retailers and reducing 
overall costs for established symbol wholesalers appears to be reflected in the traditional 
wholesaler’s dilemma of covering the costs of increasing voice opportunities by tying in their 
retailers with higher exit costs. 
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Further research 
The trends identified in this paper suggest a link between increasing exit costs, allowing 
retailer voice and turnover for the wholesalers in the convenience sector. To confirm the 
impact of exit costs and retailer voice further in depth, qualitative research is required.  
Future research that focuses upon explicit decisions where exit and voice have been used 
would look at exactly how these strategies have been deployed. Such research is imperative 
given the changing face of costs and voice in the sector as well as the pressures that are 
operative.  
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Appendix 1 
Individual wholesalers (and their Symbol groups): 
Wholesaler Fascias Owner/ stratgey Location Type 
Bookers Premier/ 
happy 
Shopper/Eur
o Shopper 
UK based plc. Varied history and 
strategies has seen the survival of one of 
the first wholesale groups in the UK. 
National and now 
in India 
Focus on C&C 
2012 purchased 
Makro so now 
have 202 UK 
branches 
Bestways Best One 
symbol 
group and 
Best In 
Est for 48 years , wholesaler for 36 years. 
Driven by founder Sir Anwar Pervez, OBE 
H Pk who came from retail and set up 
wholesale with strategy of cutting 
wholesale margins from 10% to 4%  in 
the 70’s and 80’s this the website helped 
stem the decline of local community 
stores. 
 
The group now also includes a large 
Pakistani Cement manufacturer and 
United Bank Limited with 1235 branches 
in Pakistan and 11 international 
branches, its subsidiary in the UK is now 
rebranded as UBL UK  
England, Scotland 
& Wales 
Focus on C&C 62 
branches 2012 
Blakemores SPAR 
/Lifestyle 
Express 
Largest family business in the UK owned 
by Blakemore family. 
Largest SPAR RDC in the UK. 
Commited to the ‘Blakemore way’ which 
is “To grow a family business in ways that 
are profitable and sustainable for the 
benefit of our staff, customers and 
community.” 
 
Large company owned division built on 
the acquisition of independent multiple 
retailers and other SPAR RDCs and have a 
number of head leases on independent 
retailers. 
 
Central and SE 
England & Wales 
(Acquired Cappers 
in 2012) 
 
West Midlands 1 
shop to 1150 
people; East 
Midlands 1 shop 
to 1188 people; 
Eastern 1 shop to 
1918 people; SE 1 
shop to 1149 
people; London 1 
shop to 1279 
people and Wales 
1 shop to 998 
people (ACS) 
 
Ethnicity of 
owners: 
West Midlands: 
Asian or Asian 
British 71% 
White British 28% 
Other 1% 
Born in UK 61% 
SPAR and Lifestyle 
Express (via 9 
Landmark C&Cs) 
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East Midlands: 
Asian or Asian 
British 59.5% 
White British 
38.5% 
Other 2% 
Born in UK 52.5% 
Eastern: 
Asian or Asian 
British 44.5% 
White British 53% 
Other 2.5% 
Born in UK 62.5% 
SE: 
Asian or Asian 
British 62% 
White British 32% 
Other 6% 
Born in UK 44% 
London: 
Asian or Asian 
British 89.5% 
White British 5% 
Other 5.5% 
Born in UK 24% 
Wales: 
Asian or Asian 
British 26% 
White British 70% 
Other 4% 
Born in UK 81.5%  
 
(ACS) 
Hendersons  SPAR/ Vivo 
also 
specialise in 
the larger 
formats of 
tehse stores 
(Eurospar 
and 
Vivoxtra) 
Family business moved from retail to 
wholesale over 100 years ago. 
 
Website highlights commitment to the 
SPAR guild involving retailers and 
wholesale staff in the decision making 
process. 
 
Northern Ireland Delivered 
wholesaler 
concentrating on 
its two brands 
SPAR & Vivo 
Halls SPAR Family owned business recently 
reinvested in state of the art distribution 
centre to service their SPAR estate. 
Concentrate on supply chain have own 
butchery and sandwich making divisions, 
large company owned division  
 
Large company owned division partly 
built on the acquisition of independent 
multiple retail operators. 
Northern England 
covering NW,NE 
and Yorks Humb 
with (according to 
ACS : 1 shop to 
1263 people,1 
shop to 1,200 
people and 1shop 
to 1272people 
respectively) 
Ethnicity of 
owners: 
NORTH WEST 
Asian or Asian 
Delivered 
wholesaler 
focused on SPAR. 
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British 35% 
White British 63% 
Other 2% 
Born in UK 76.5% 
NORTH EAST 
Asian or Asian 
British 49% 
White British 
50.5% 
Other 0.5% 
Born in UK 73% 
YORKS. / HUMBER 
Asian or Asian 
British 40% 
White British 60% 
Other 0% 
Born in UK 73.5% 
 
Langs SPAR Family owned business  
Focused on supplying goods to retailers 
 
Recently disposed of its Martex C&C 
operation. 
Large company owned division , built 
partly on the acquisition of independent 
multiple operators (Gillespie’s) but have 
lost a number of their multiple 
independent retailers to Coop (Solowoski 
and Botterils) 
Scotland (with 
according to ACS 1 
shop to 973 
people) 
Owners:  
Asian or Asian 
British 46.5% 
White British 44% 
Other 9.5% 
Born in UK 71% 
(ACS) 
Ethnicity of 
owners: 
SCOTLAND 
Asian or Asian 
British 46.5% 
White British 44% 
Other 9.5% 
Born in UK 71% 
Delivered 
wholesaler 
focused on SPAR. 
Appleby 
Westward 
SPAR Director buy out in 2006 from BWG (Part 
of the Group Pernod Ricard), the CEO Leo 
Crawford is also president of SPAR 
International. 
 
Mission to be a consumer led, retail 
focused wholesaler. 
 
Started a company owned division having 
purchased 4 Fine fare stores to convert 
into Eurospars which have subsequently 
been disposed of. 
SW England (with 
one shop to 1162 
people (ACS)) 
Ethnicity of 
owners: 
SOUTH WEST 
Asian or Asian 
British 13% 
White British 
84.5% 
Other 2.5% 
Born in UK 85% 
Delivered 
wholesaler 
focused on SPAR. 
Dhamecha  (Todays) 7 depots all within M25 corridor 
Set up as Wholesale operation now 
managed by the second generation – 
cousins Pradip and Manish Dhamecha 
and brother in law Mukesh Vithlani, but 
the original principles remain the same - 
“the Customer is King and, therefore, 
London (one shop 
to 1279 people 
(ACS)) 
Ethnicity of 
owners: 
LONDON 
Asian or Asian 
C&C 
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deserves competitive pricing, excellent 
product availability and an absolute 
commitment to first-class customer-
service”. 
British 89.5% 
White British 5% 
Other 5.5% 
Born in UK 24% 
United 
Wholesale  
 
Day-Today) Our mission statement is a commitment 
to support and grow the Independent 
Retail Sector by providing top class 
branded products at competitive prices 
together with retail advice and 
merchandising support that benefit the 
end consumer. 
The attitude we bring to our marketing 
has become the benchmark for other 
Cash and Carrys. Our themed marketing 
is organised both in and out of industry 
and such marketing successes have been 
recognised within the Wholesale 
Industry.  
 
C&C and DW 
central belt, 
borders and 
Ayrshire in 
Scotland ( 1 shop 
to 973 people 
(ACS)) 
(with 1 shop to 
973 people(ACS)) 
 
Ethnicity of 
owners: 
SCOTLAND 
Asian or Asian 
British 46.5% 
White British 44% 
Other 9.5% 
Born in UK 71% 
C&C and DW 
central belt, 
borders and 
Ayrshire in 
Scotland 
Filshills  Key store 
(todays 
whoelsaer) 
Based in Glasgow .with sales office in 
Edinburgh Est in 1875 as a confectionery 
manufacturer gradually moved over to 
wholesaling now expanding range and 
includes alcohol, tobacco, soft drinks, 
crisps & snacks and grocery. Recently a 
chilled section has been added to make 
the range more comprehensive. 
C&C and DC to 
Scotland and N 
England (to Leeds) 
 
(with Scotland  1 
shop to 973 
people, Northern 
England covering 
NW,NE and Yorks 
Humb with 
(according to ACS : 
1 shop to 1263 
people,1 shop to 
1,200 people and 
1shop to 
1272people 
respectively) 
(ACS)) 
 
Ethnicity of 
owners: 
SCOTLAND 
Asian or Asian 
British 46.5% 
White British 44% 
Other 9.5% 
Born in UK 71% 
NORTH WEST 
Asian or Asian 
British 35% 
White British 63% 
Other 2% 
Born in UK 76.5% 
NORTH EAST 
C&C and DW to 
Scotland and N 
England (to Leeds) 
32 
 
Asian or Asian 
British 49% 
White British 
50.5% 
Other 0.5% 
Born in UK 73% 
YORKS. / HUMBER 
Asian or Asian 
British 40% 
White British 60% 
Other 0% 
Born in UK 73.5% 
 
 
 
Parfett  
 
Go Local/Go 
Local Plus 
and Go Local 
extra 
(symbol 
created by 
Parfetts) 
 
(Landmark) 
Family owned set up in 1989 but in 2008 
55% shares sold to employees with 
intention of making this an entirely 
employee owned operation offering a 
conversion route for retailers from C&C 
through to symbol group 
C& C  Noth of 
England will stock 
lines on request 
and export 
division to 
customers outside 
of UK  
 
Northern England 
covering NW,NE 
and Eastern with 
(according to ACS : 
1 shop to 1263 
people,1 shop to 
1,200 people and 
1shop to 1918 
people 
respectively) 
 
Ethnicity of 
owners: 
NORTH WEST 
Asian or Asian 
British 35% 
White British 63% 
Other 2% 
Born in UK 76.5% 
NORTH EAST 
Asian or Asian 
British 49% 
White British 
50.5% 
Other 0.5% 
Born in UK 73% 
YORKS. / HUMBER 
Asian or Asian 
British 40% 
White British 60% 
Other 0% 
Born in UK 73.5% 
 
C&C North  
England 
33 
 
DCS  Landmark SET up by founder now  focusing on 
distribution of health and beauty goods  
and not in the wholesaling to symbol 
store sector 
  
East End  
 
Landmark East End Foods has over 35 years' 
experience as a leading Supplier and 
innovator in the UK Indian food market, 
with an annual turnover of over £100m. 
We are trusted Suppliers of high quality 
Ethnic Foods to a wide range of markets 
from our progressive plant in the West 
Midlands, at the centre of the national 
distribution network. Over 80% of Asian 
Independents stock East End's range as 
well as all the Major UK Multiples. 
 
So not focusing on creating symbol 
groups and not in the wholesaling to 
symbol store sector 
 
  
Bibbys Costcutter, 
My 
Costcutter & 
Kwiksave 
Originally fromed in 1986 asa breakaway 
groups from SPAR with a charismatic 
leader group grew rapidly bought by 
Bibby Group after Bibbys failed attempt 
to take over NISA 
UK & Ireland Symbol Group 
Palmer & 
Harvey 
 
MACE  UK Biggest 
delivered 
wholesale 
DW 
Musgraves Budgens/Lo
ndis 
Owned by Musgraves main operation still 
in the Republic of Ireland. 
Budgens aimed at areas with strong 
ABC1 demographic 
Ireland, UK and 
Spain 
 
 
